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Abstract
Political trolls initiate online discord not only for the lulz
(laughs), but also for ideological reasons, such as promot-
ing their desired political candidates. Political troll groups
recently gained spotlight because they were considered cen-
tral in helping Donald Trump win the 2016 US presidential
election, which involved difficult mass mobilizations. Politi-
cal trolls face unique challenges as they must build their own
communities while simultaneously disrupting others. How-
ever, little is known about how political trolls mobilize suffi-
cient participation to suddenly become problems for others.
We performed a quantitative longitudinal analysis of more
than 16 million comments from one of the most popular
and disruptive political trolling communities, the subreddit
/r/The Donald (T D). We use T D as a lens to under-
stand participation and collective action within these deviant
spaces. In specific, we first study the characteristics of the
most active participants to uncover what might drive their
sustained participation. Next, we investigate how these active
individuals mobilize their community to action. Through our
analysis we uncover that the most active employed distinct
discursive strategies to mobilize participation, and deployed
technical tools like bots to create a shared identity and sustain
engagement. We conclude by providing data-backed design
implications for designers of civic media.
Introduction
The short history of politics and information technology
suggests a pattern: there is a four year gap between the ca-
pabilities of information technology and their adoption in
U.S. presidential campaigns. The web existed in 1996, but
did not become relevant until the 2000 campaign; blogs ex-
isted in 2000; but were not influential until 2004; Facebook
existed in 2004, but only made a splash in 2008; Twitter ex-
isted in 2008, but did not become essential until 2012. What
then should we make of the 2016 presidential campaign
and the 2012-era technologies they adopted? We argue that
information filtering platforms like reddit, which demon-
strated their capabilities for coordinating influential collec-
tive action before 2012, were politically weaponized in 2016
in the form of trolling communities like /r/The Donald
(T D). Trolling is hardly a new phenomenon (Phillips 2015).
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However, socio-technical systems like reddit, have techni-
cal affordances and popular influence that have enabled new
forms of sustained disruption. However, we have yet to un-
derstand this new emerging complex organization in depth.
While prior work has documented trolls’ extreme tactics
(Summit-Gil 2016) or explored methods for detecting and
moderating trolls (Kumar, Cheng, and Leskovec 2017), on-
line deviance researchers have overlooked how trolls must
fulfill similar social and technical prerequisites to succeed
like any other online community. We lack an understand-
ing how these communities “successfully” self-organize to
cause harm. We argue troll communities manage the same
fundamental challenges faced by other online communi-
ties, especially sustaining participation and initiating col-
lective action (Kraut et al. 2012). The success of troll com-
munities allows them to become problems for other online
communities by undermining generalized norms of credi-
bility, trust, and respect, which are essential for democratic
self-governance. A deeper understanding of how political
trolls mobilize will enable better preparations for when 2016
socio-technical capabilities are applied in 2020 elections.
In this paper we conduct a large scale empirical analysis
on one of the most active and largest political trolling com-
munities during the 2016 US presidential election: the sub-
reddit /r/The Donald (Wikipedia 2016). T D received
significant media coverage due to its coordinated trolling
efforts intended to disrupt and harass Trump’s opponents
(MSNBC 2016; The-New-Yorker 2017). Participants of T D
trolled in various ways: they organized Netflix boycotts after
Netflix promoted TV shows opposing their political views
(Rare 2017; Decider 2017), orchestrated one-star Amazon
reviews for Megyn Kelly’s book (Huffington-Post 2016;
Fortune 2016). Members of T D also organized the “Great
Meme War” to harass Trump’s detractors and flood the
Internet with pro-Trump, anti-Hillary Clinton propaganda
(Politico 2017). Participants of T D also actively promoted
the use of satirical hashtags, such as #DraftOurDaughters to
troll Hillary Clinton’s initiative about supporting women to
register for the military draft (Politico 2018) or #ShariaOur-
Daughters to take Islam ideologies to an absurd extreme
(Reddit 2016b).
We use T D as a lens to understand how a political trolling
community manages its own challenges around sustaining
participation and mobilization at scale. We conduct an em-
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pirical analysis on more than 16 million comments posted
over almost two years on T D to understand these research
questions:
1. What are the behavioral patterns of the most active partic-
ipants in a political trolling community?
2. How does a political trolling community mobilize its
members to action?
Unlike other online communities, T D created socio-
technical tools that integrated bots, gamified mechanisms,
and “calls to action” to promote a shared identity and to
motivate participation. The most effective calls to action
provided a detailed understanding of why the community
needed to participate. These findings have implications for
developing more effective moderation strategies to govern
trolling communities, identifying calls to action likely to
lead to disruptive behavior, and designing more inclusive
civic media technologies.
Background
Our research draws from two areas of prior literature: (1)
how social media facilitates collective action and (2) how
deviant and trolling behaviors develop in online communi-
ties. This background identifies a reciprocal gap in our un-
derstanding of how collective action processes can be used
towards deviant ends as well as how deviant online commu-
nities must fulfill the similar social and technical prerequi-
sites to succeed like any other online community.
Social Media Facilitating Collective Action.
Collective action constitutes efforts done by a group of peo-
ple to achieve a common goal (Olson 2009). Social media
facilitates collective action by offering:
Mobilizing Structures: Social media influences people
to take action in support of a cause, such was the case in the
“#BlackLivesMatter”, “Occupy” or “Arab Spring” move-
ments. Social media facilitated the mobilization of street
protests by providing reliable communication channels as
well as the social proof to encourage others to mobilize
(De Choudhury et al. 2016).
Opportunity Structures: Social media promotes (or hin-
ders) collective action by creating (or destroying) opportu-
nities to communicate needs and to discover allies. Requests
for help can unexpectedly be met with assistance, which en-
ables positive feedback loops of reciprocal support that le-
gitimizes the action (Althoff, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and
Jurafsky 2014).
Framing Processes: Social media provides structures for
making sense of the reality surrounding a collective effort.
Being able to negotiate the interpretations and meanings of
a collective effort is important because it provides a way to
legitimate or motivate the actions of the group. For instance,
some women have been using social media to interpret the
street harassment they experience, to then create effective
campaigns for fighting back against street harassment (Di-
mond et al. 2013).
While social media appear to facilitate collective action
in politics (Matias 2016), less is known about the ability for
deviant sub-communities to use leverage technological ca-
pabilities and coordinated social practices to support regres-
sive, anti-social, or other disruptive online collective action.
How are online communities like sub-reddits used by po-
litical trolls to produce collective action? What are their op-
portunity and mobilization structures? what do their framing
processes look like?
Deviance and Trolling in Online Communities
Trolls operate within social contexts that must fulfill sim-
ilar social and technical prerequisites to succeed like any
other online community. Despite the dysfunction they visit
upon others, deviant sub-communities within 4Chan (Bern-
stein et al. 2011; Hine et al. 2017), Something Awful (Pa-
ter et al. 2014), or reddit (Massanari 2017) have their own
norms, mechanisms for regulating user behavior, and so-
cializing newcomers. While previous work has documented
the extreme acts conducted by these trolling communities
(Shachaf and Hara 2010), our understanding of how these
communities organize to cause harm is incomplete.
The targets of organized trolling efforts can experience
a wide range of consequences: depression, helplessness,
anxiety, low levels of self-esteem, frustration, insecurity
and fear (Cheng et al. 2017; Coles and West 2016). More
extreme cases of trolling behavior includes the case of
#GamerGate, where anonymous trolls collectively targeted
female gamers, doxxed them, and made violent threats with
the goal of driving them off social media platforms to silence
their message (Massanari 2017). Hacking, trolling, and other
forms of cyber-disruption have also taken on geopolitical di-
mensions as national governments invest in covertly spread-
ing or undermining messages. The Russian government has
supported efforts to discredit leaders and activists opposed
to the Putin government (The-Guardian 2017). Large-scale
trolling campaigns supporting Donald Trump’s candidacy
for president coordinated raids on opponents’ online com-
munities. These political trolls strategically spread misinfor-
mation, and generated content to mock the opposition (The-
Intercept 2016). The “Fifty Cent Army” behind China’s
Great Firewall rigorously enforce trolling type messages
against the limited dissent permitted (Han 2015).
The majority of research around online trolling commu-
nities has focused on characterizing their anti-social behav-
ior (Cheng, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec 2015),
identifying trolls (Gardiner et al. 2016; Kumar et al. 2017;
Samory and Peserico 2017), or predicting users at risk of
adopting trolling behavior (Cheng et al. 2017). There re-
mains a critical need to understand how trolls organize col-
lective action and manage to carry out their disruptions that
are sustained, focused, and unfortunately effective despite
concerted moderation efforts.
Qualitative research on political trolls has emphasized
their motivations to participate and tactics to target their op-
ponents (Sanfilippo, Yang, and Fichman 2017; Bradshaw
and Howard 2017; Coleman 2014; Phillips 2015). While
some trolls are in it for the “lulz” (Coleman 2014) (i.e.,
to provoke Internet users for the laughs), political trolls
are usually in it for ideological reasons. Tactics of political
trolls include baiting ideological opponents into arguments
Post
Comment
Figure 1: Example of reddit Post.
or coordinating “civic spamming” campaigns (Insider 2016;
Huffington-Post 2017).
We build off this prior work to now conduct a large scale
quantitative analysis to understand how these deviant groups
manage the same fundamental challenges of motivating and
governing participation faced by traditional online commu-
nities in their own communities (Kraut et al. 2012).
Data Collection
Reddit was created in 2005 by Steve Huffman and Alexis
Ohanian as a community-driven platform for discussion,
news aggregation and content rating (Singer et al. 2014).
The platform is composed of thousands of sub-communities
(“subreddits”) focused on different topics. People on reddit
can submit posts to a subreddit and others can up- or down-
vote the posts as well as comment on them. Figure 1 pro-
vides an example of a post with a comment.
We focus on the subreddit /r/The Donald (T D)1,
which originated around the time Donald Trump announced
his presidential run in June 2015. This subreddit followed
all of Donald Trump’s presidential run, his presidential win,
and all of his actions and controversies in his presidential ad-
ministration. The interface on T D is similar to an old Geoci-
ties website from the 1990s, complete with an animated GIF
that has Donald Trump winking when you direct your mouse
over him. T D had over 468,000 “centipedes,” or subscribers
2, and typically has around 5,000 visitors at any given time
(Wikipedia 2016).
T D generated controversial within the reddit community,
across social media, and in political journalism during the
2016 presidential election. Many reddit users complained
about the presence of T D, calling the subreddit’s content
“hateful” and claiming that it drowned out more substan-
tive political deliberation. A substantial amount of content
posted to T D allegedly originated from “alt-right” users,
who supported president Donald Trump, while participating
in racist, sexist, Islamophobic, and other anti-social subred-
dits (Lyons 2017). T D was labeled as one of the most active
and largest political troll communities (Wikipedia 2016).
We used a public dataset3 of all of the posts, comments,
upvotes, downvotes of T D from June 30th, 2015 to Febru-
1https://www.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/
2http://redditmetrics.com/r/The_Donald
3http://saviaga.com/the_donald-dataset/
ary 28th 2017. We collected 16,349,287 comments from
342,731 participants.
RQ1: Behavioral Patterns of the Most Active
Research Question 1 asked, “what are the behavioral pat-
terns of the most active participants in a political trolling
community?” We examined the most-active users by com-
menting activity in the T D. Commenting is a good indicator
of involvement because it demands more engagement than
simply up-voting/down-voting content. Understanding these
individuals in greater depth becomes especially important as
political troll communities depend on active contributions to
carry out their disruptive mission.
Method.
We identified T D users who commented three times above
the standard deviation of the average user’s commenting
behavior on the subreddit. We identified 3,427 individu-
als who generated 6,251,857 comments. Next, we analyzed
the distinct words, slang, profanity, public figures and or-
ganizations used in each user’s comments comments. We
study these metrics given that prior work has identified they
can serve to characterize behavioral patterns of subversive
groups (Savage and Monroy-Herna´ndez 2015).
We identify distinct words using the TF-IDF metric and
manually created a list of full, common, and nicknames and
then flagged any posts or comments that mentioned any
of the names to measure how users mentioned tokens re-
lated to organizations or public figures involved in the 2016
elections. We also collected the names from Wikipedia 4,
and news articles on Trump’s nicknames for his opponents
(Fox-News 2017; NY-Daily-News 2017). We went through
each of the Wikipedia and news articles articles and added
or merged the alternate names for each person. For exam-
ple, Trump called Senator Elizabeth Warren “Pocahontas”
and “Kim Jong-un” was “Little Rocket Man”. To identify
slang we used a list of words known to represent the unique
vocabulary of Trump supporters (Rose 2017; Vice 2017;
LA-Times 2017). To identify profanity we used a public li-
brary that given a text can state its number of swear words5.
Results
The most active accounts on T D are a mix of bots and
humans. 1% of these accounts had the term “bot” in their
username, e.g., “TrumpTrainBot”. We considered that these
were potentially bots or at least humans pretending to be
bots. Their top 20 words with highest TF-IDF scores (for
both potential bots and humans) corresponded to pro-Trump
slang, such as: “MAGA” or “Centipedes”. We also ob-
served that the humans in this group constantly shared the
same YouTube videos, usually whimsical videos promot-
ing Trump. For instance, the following video youtu.be/
hgM2xN5TPgw, a comical song about the “Trump train”
(term used to refer to the movement of American voters
supporting Donald Trump) was mentioned 54,550 times by
these individuals.
4http://bit.ly/2Hq1zmf
5http://bit.ly/2qkZ1OU
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Figure 2: Slang used in Comments
Given the importance of slang among these most active
users, we refined our analysis of their jargon. Figure 2 visu-
alizes the relationships between the most active users’ num-
ber of comments (X axis) against the number of comments
they generated with slang (Y axis). Some of the accounts
using the most slang were bots (they appear higher in the
Y axis). Although bots were not a majority among the most
active users (only 1% of all accounts), they produced the ma-
jority of the content with pro-Trump slang. However, these
bots do appear to have been successful in engaging the com-
munity: the bots only generated content if people replied to
them or if someone mentioned pro-Trump slang. If we see
that the bots are among the most active it is because peo-
ple were actively interacting with them or using their related
slang words. The humans and the bots in T D constantly
engaged with each other by commenting on each others’
posts. Humans engaged with the bots to play games with
them. The most active bots (Figure 2) had a gamification
component and were activated when participants used cer-
tain slang words or mentioned the bot. For example, in the
“TrumpTrainBot” users are in charge of “moving forward”
the “Trump Train.” This bot increases its speed each time
people use pro-Trump slang or reply to the bot. This bot
generated a total of 54,540 comments. An example message
from the “TrumpTrainBot” included:
“WE JUST CAN’T STOP WINNING, FOLKS THE
TRUMP TRAIN JUST GOT 10 BILLION MPH
FASTER CURRENT SPEED 175,219,385,117,000
MPH. At that rate, it would take approximately 9.209
years to travel to the Andromeda Galaxy (2.5 million
light-years)!”. The bot “Trumpcoatbot” was activated
21,569 times, while the bots “MAGABrickBot”, “The-
WallGrowsBot” and “TheWallGrowsTallerBot” which
referenced “building a wall” were activated 27,187,
23,373 and 7,609 times respectively, and had a similar
game dynamic as the “TrumpTrainBot”.
These gaming mechanisms might have helped to entertain
and keep T D participants active.
Most of the top words used by these highly active partic-
ipants were slang words, but with a pejorative connotation,
such as “cuck”. While the word is a derogatory slang term
for a weak, or inadequate man, the word gained popular-
ity in T D to denote conservatives (“cuckservatives” ) who
lacked “real leadership” and challenged Donald Trump on
his spelling, his logic, or his facts (GQ 2016). The word was
used 90,047 times. In contrast, mainstream profanity like
“fuck” was used 252,754 times. The use of specialized slang
and profanity within the community was highly popularized.
RQ2: Styles for Calling a Political Troll
Community to Action
Research Question 2 asked, “How does a political trolling
community mobilize its members to action?” What “styles”
were adopted to mobilize the community? (i.e., ways of call-
ing the community to action). Do different call to action
styles exhibit different engagement patterns? Are they using
offensive messages?
Identifying Call to Action Styles. To uncover how indi-
viduals tried to mobilize T D, we first identified all posts that
were potential calls to action. We used lists of action verbs
to flag posts with possible calls to action. Through this pro-
cess we identified 5,603 posts. Next, we hired three English-
speaking college educated crowd workers from Upwork to
categorize whether each of the posts made a call to action or
not (it could be that the post had action verbs, but did not try
to mobilize others.) The two coders agreed on 3,274 posts
(Cohen’s kappa: 0.58: Moderate agreement). We then asked
a third coder to label the remaining posts upon which the first
two coders disagreed. We used a “majority rule” approach to
determine the category for those remaining posts.
Once we had the posts categorized into “call to action”
and “non call to action” posts, we identified the authors of
the posts and characterized them based on their “style” for
making calls to action. We considered each individual had a
particular style for mobilizing others. Our goal was to clus-
ter together the individuals that used the same style. For this
purpose we represented each individual, as a vector where
the components of the vector were: (1) the likelihood of
making a call to action with a link attached: number of calls
to action the person made with a link over their total num-
ber of calls to action; (2) likelihood of mentioning a public
figure or organization: number of times public figures or or-
ganizations were mentioned over the total number of words
in her calls to action (notice that similar procedure was fol-
lowed for slang and profanity); (3) likelihood of using slang;
and (4) likelihood of using profanity, (5) the median number
of words in the call to action over the median number of
words the person used in general in her posts.
After this step, each user was represented as a feature vec-
tor of size 5. Notice that the features we considered were
similar to those used by prior work to characterize the mes-
sages of deviant groups (Savage and Monroy-Herna´ndez
2015). We then used a clustering method to group similar
feature vectors (people with similar call to action styles). We
use mean shift algorithm (Cheng 1995) to group together
Call to Action Engagement Stats
“Historian” style
Number of Upvotes:
Min = 83, Max = 30,226,
µ = 2, 890.32, σ = 3, 808.81
Number of Comments:
Min = 1 Max = 2069,
µ = 92.69, σ = 188.48
“Viral News” style
Number of Upvotes:
Min = 84, Max = 15,625,
µ = 2, 404.85, σ = 2, 497.64
Number of Comments:
Min = 1 Max = 511,
µ = 84.73, σ = 138.37
“Troll Slang” style
Number of Upvotes:
Min = 81, Max = 32,970,
µ = 2,330.01, σ = 3, 735.77
Number of Comments:
Min = 1, Max = 1907,
µ = 55.60, σ = 127.28
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Calls to Action Styles
similar vectors because it provides a non-parametric den-
sity estimation, and therefore does not require a prior for
the number of clusters beforehand (unlike K-means). Mean
shift helps us to discover different clusters of people, where
each cluster represents groups of individuals with a particu-
lar style for making calls to action. Next, we inspected each
cluster in detail to better understand the call to action style
being used. In particular, we looked at: the number of calls
to action and words used; distinct words present in the calls
to action; public figures and organization mentioned; slang
and profanity used.
Results.
1,608 of the posts generated by the most active T D par-
ticipants were calls to action, and 1,350 individuals made
those calls to action (almost 40% of the most active individ-
uals on T D called the community to action at least once.)
These individuals had three main styles for making those
calls to action (i.e., we discovered three main clusters). Table
1 presents an overview of the different styles and the com-
munity’s engagement. Figure 3 shows the clustering results
that distinguish the three call to action styles. Within each
cluster, the histograms indicate the proportion of each of the
features. Notice that we follow an approach that is similar to
that of prior work to visualize the clusters (Hu et al. 2014).
Cluster 1: “Troll Slang style”: The individuals using this
style represented 40% of those who made calls to action. The
individuals in this cluster used the most “pro-Trump slang”
(Figure 3). For instance, the following call to action uses the
slang: “deplorables” and “centipedes,”:
“Calling SPANISH-SPEAKING DEPLORABLES!!!
Want to do something that will make a difference and
win Trump VOTES? [...] Share with any Latino Cen-
tipedes!”
The slang word most used was “kek”. That word alone
was present in over 14% of the calls to action of this group.
Figure 3: Features in each Call to Action Style. The Troll
Slang style used the most slang in its calls to action; the Viral
news style referenced the most links; and the Historian style
used the most number of words intermixed with profanity in
its calls to action.
Notice that “Kek’ represents an Egyptian god that is de-
picted with a frog head and thus holding similarities to the
meme of “Pepe the frog,” linked to the pro-Trump and alt-
Right movements. Given this distinct usage for specialized
words and icons, we refer to this call to action style as the
“Troll Slang” style.
One popular call to action of this cluster revolved around
“deporting” people. The term “deportation” was used in al-
most 15% of their calls to action. This word was used in
two contexts: the first was regarding the deportation of im-
migrants from the US. The second was related to a “troll
button” that participants could use against others (Reddit
2016a), to call out trolling (or undesirable) behavior within
the community:
“Time to hit that deport button on these trolls to-
day...don’t be scared...just do it”.
This style also had the particularity that it called people
to action towards causes that Trump’s opposition labeled as
“conspiracy theories” or “fake news stories”. For instance,
certain calls requested people to take action in response
to conspiracies surrounding the murder of Democratic Na-
tional Committee employee Seth Rich (Washington-Post
2017). An example:
“Computer Wizards and Artists: Can we please get a
good infographic on the Seth Rich murder with known
facts and inconsistencies to share on social media?
Don’t let cucked admins derail us now, this case is
cracking at the seams!”
This style was also the one that used profanity the second
most. The profanity was usually used against Trump’s oppo-
nents. In general, the style of these calls to action appear to
be based on creating a collective identity by utilizing slang
supporting their political believes and promoting causes or
stories that their opposition deems to be unreal. The creation
of such collective identity might facilitate driving people to
action, as language and the use of slang solidifies the iden-
tity of a group (Sarabia and Shriver 2004). However, this
style was in general the one that received the lowest engage-
ment from the community (this style received the smallest
median number of comments and upvotes). The slang and
“conspiracy theories” might have been difficult for newcom-
ers or less committed community members to follow, and
hence their participation was more limited. However, we did
observe that this call to action style was able to generate
the largest number of upvotes for one post that called the
community to take action and report an NBC employee that
mocked Trump’s 10-year old child, Barron:
“SNL writer calls Barron Trump a homeschool shooter
be a shame if a bunch of us forwarded this to NBC”
Cluster 2: “Viral News” style: The people in this clus-
ter (9% of all the individuals making calls to action) had a
style that focused primarily on posting a link to a news story
and then asking people to share and popularize on different
social media platforms. This cluster shared the most number
of links in its calls to action (Figure 3). Given this behavior
of distributing news, we named this style “Viral News”.
An example call to action:
“It has arrived. The Top Hillary Crimes in one list.
FBI docs, Wikileaks, and more. GET IN HERE! [...]
This list needs to be at the top every single day
until the election. MAGA [...] Share this short link
on Twitter and Facebook with the usual hashtags
http://redd.it/59sh7p”
This call to action style also used the least slang and prac-
tically did not use also any profanity, only 6% of its calls to
action had profanity and it used the least amount of words
(Figure 3). While this style had the least number of people
involved, and the calls to action were the most sporadic, the
style in general ensured that large crowds participated in its
calls to action (its average number of upvotes and comments
were more than the “Troll Slang” style). It might have been
that the straightforward aspect of the call to action facili-
tated mobilization (even despite its inconsistency and lim-
ited number of organizers).
Cluster 3: “Historian” style: The calls to action in this
cluster were generated by 51% of the individuals who were
making the calls to action. This style focused on first ex-
plaining in detail the political ecosystem and then request-
ing people to take a specific action. This style was the one
with the most amount of words in proportion with the others
(Fig. 3). This dynamic of explaining the background infor-
mation to actions being requested lead us to name this style
the “Historian.” An example:
“Tomorrow the House is scheduled to vote to elim-
inate consumer privacy online. Call your representa-
tives. Tell them to vote NO [...] net neutrality and your
privacy online is something that every side must fight
for. Particularly if you’re a conservative who doesn’t
want to have everything they do be sold to the high-
est bidder [...] The founding fathers of this country be-
lieved in certain unalienable rights [...] If the founding
fathers were alive today, protecting your privacy online
would be paramount on their list.”
      0          500         1000      1500      2000  
Comments
U
pv
ot
es
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000 “Historian” 
style
“Viral News”
tyle
“Troll Slang”
style
Figure 4: Number of upvotes and comments that each call to
action received. We color code call to actions based on their
style.
This style mentioned the most public figures and the most
profanity in its calls to action (32% of the calls to action ref-
erenced public figures or organizations and 33% of the calls
to action used profanity. The profanity used was against po-
litical situations and was rarely used to attack political op-
ponents). This style did not directly give people orders, but
rather suggested which actions were needed. Suggestions to
take action were also frequently followed by the assertion
that said action was already performed by others, includ-
ing the person that made the suggestion in the first place.
For instance, the following post explains to people why they
should eliminate their Netflix account (as it supports the op-
position’s ideology), and showcases that the poster has her-
self already cancelled her account:
“...All the more reason that we should dump Netflix.
Their ”Dear White People Show” they released is a bit
too preachy. If Soros is funding, hell yes, I’m done. Pic
related: My cancellation receipt..”
This approach might be helpful to convince people to take
action in their effort to follow the example of their peers
(Banerjee 1992; Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz 1969).
The “Historian” style was the most effective call to action
style in terms of the average number of comments and up-
votes it secured (it was the call to action style that was able to
more consistently assure action from a large crowd in T D).
Understanding Engagement and Call to Action Style.
To understand how the community reacted to each call to
action style, we plotted the number of upvotes (X axis) and
number of comments (Y axis) that each call to action re-
ceived and color-coded them according to the style it be-
longed to. Figure 4 shows that the “Historian” style appears
to have continuously obtained a high number of upvotes and
comments. However, the “Troll Slang” style occasionally
managed to secure more engagement than the “Historian”
style. But this was not common. The “Viral News” style
although it was more rarely used, received similar number
of upvotes and comments regardless. The community usu-
ally engaged with this style less than with the “Historian”
style. But it received occasionally more engagement than the
“Troll Slang” style.
To further understand if a call to action style exhibited
Figure 5: Cumulative distribution associated with (a) Upvote
rate (b) Comment rate and
a different engagement pattern than other styles, we com-
puted the number of upvotes and comment that each of its
related posts received and plotted the corresponding Cumu-
lative Distribution Functions (CDF) as seen in Figure 5. To
determine whether there are significant differences between
the three datasets (i.e., between the number of comments
and upvotes that a type of call to action style receives),
we used a Kruskal-Wallis H test to investigate the similar-
ities/differences between the number of comments and up-
votes across call to action styles. The test statistic for the
number of upvotes was H = 23.066 with p-value <.001.
The test statistics for the comments was H = 33.587 with
p-value <.001. Therefore, the median number of comments
that each style received was significantly different. Overall,
the community’s engagement with each call to action style
was different. We believe that the “Historian” style helped
to maintain the community continuously engaged and on the
same page about what was occurring in the political ecosys-
tem. But the “Viral News” style helped to rapidly mobilize
the community at a given point in time (that was why these
calls to action could be sporadic and without adopting any
of the community slang).
Discussion
We discuss our results using the previously described themes
that facilitate collective action: framing processes, mobiliz-
ing structures, and opportunity structures. We finish by also
discussing implications of our research.
Mobilization Structures.
T D presented three distinct styles or strategies for mobiliz-
ing the community. The “Historian” style was the most ef-
fective for retaining and mobilizing a large crowd of highly-
active community members. Civic technology research ar-
gues that establishing opponents can be mobilized by nar-
rating the ideals of what is being fought for (Dimond et
al. 2013). In this case, the “Historian” style facilitated long
term participation because its detailed explanations helped
individuals to understand the community’s reasoning in the
current political ecosystem and thus take action. Therefore,
adequately framing what is occurring is important in mobi-
lization.
Framing Process.
The “Troll Slang” style integrated pro-Trump vocabulary
into its calls to action, likely helping to frame and narrate
the collective identity of T D. Previous work in online com-
munities has identified the importance of building an iden-
tity with community members in order to facilitate mobi-
lization (Kraut et al. 2012). Notice, however, that in online
groups opposing the establishment if the goal is to mobilize,
it might be better to focus on sharing the community’s cause
rather than the vocabulary that the community uses.
The “Troll Slang” style discussed “conspiracy theories”
(CNN 2017) to a significant extent. The term “conspiracy
theorist” originated in the 70s with the CIA as an effort to
refute anyone who challenged official narratives. Therefore,
when we see trolls engaging with alleged conspiracy theo-
ries, it means they are framing events in a way that their op-
position (in this case the “Establishment”) has somehow dis-
credited. Engaging in conspiracy theories thus also helps to
promote T D’s collective identity as it establishes a dynamic
where T D promotes stories that the community believes are
true versus the stories that the others (the opposition) dis-
credits.
Opportunity Structures.
Calls to action following the “Viral News” style had a very
straightforward way of requesting action and was the most
effective at mobilizing the largest crowds. This resembles
the findings of research in online civic platforms where di-
rect requests usually garnered more participation than “more
manipulative” calls to action (Savage, Monroy-Hernandez,
and Ho¨llerer 2016). In this case, being direct and simple
might have been a better opportunity to more easily mobilize
a much larger mass. Individuals did not have to invest much
in reading about the problem being addressed, or spend time
learning the culture. They simply focused on executing. The
ability to rapidly take action is an opportunity structure that
facilitated participation in this case. This is something that
the “Troll Slang” style was never able to accomplish with
posts that called “all centipedes” into action. However the
“Historian” style might be helping to indoctrinate newcom-
ers about the community’s belief system and the reasons be-
hind it, which in turn facilitated afterwards the mobilization
of participants at the time it was needed without much ex-
planation about the reasons. One characteristic of the “His-
torian” style is that it occurred more frequently. The “Histo-
rian” style was adopted to promote the community’s belief
system, but this also created opportunities to drive the com-
munity to take rapid action when needed without having to
explain much in detail (“Viral News” style).
Bots within reddit have been used mainly for automated
support for human moderators (Long et al. 2017), upvoting
or downvoting posts (Gilbert 2013) and for entertainment
(Massanari 2016). However, T D subreddit to our knowledge
was one of the first to opportunistically use bots for creating
an identity and engagement in a political context.
It has been found that design structures from games, such
as levels, achievements, points, and leader boards increase
people’s motivation to participate in an online community
(Iacovides et al. 2013). T D might be using bots to oppor-
tunistically drive more participation through games. Notice
also that bots such as “TrumpTrainBot” or “TheWallGrows-
Bot” used slang which likely also provided the opportunity
to promote a sense of identity within T D (Short and Hughes
2006; Sarabia and Shriver 2004).
Implications for Collective Action Theories
Research in collective action sustains that a successful way
to mobilize people is by effectively communicating the goals
and purpose of the movement (Bennett and Segerberg 2011),
as well as developing a sense of identity among participants
(Kraut et al. 2012). Our findings align with these theories
as the calls to action in The Donald that were able to re-
tain and mobilize the largest number of participants, were
the ones that explained in detail the motives of why they
were calling to action and what they were trying to accom-
plish. What is interesting is that our research uncovered how
within subversive environments, where the community had
large opposition, it was more important to explain the mo-
tives of the organization instead of promoting an identity for
the community. This was essential in order to rapidly mobi-
lize more people.
Implications for Designers of Civic Media
Our results suggest that taking the time to explain the po-
litical ecosystem and showing that they already have taken
some sort of action could have been crucial in making peo-
ple on T D participate in collective action long term in their
effort to follow the example of their peers. Designers of civic
technologies could take this into account to create online
tools that help politicians and governments to more easily
trigger their long term participation in particular political en-
deavors. Social networks such as Facebook and reddit exist,
however they are not tailored to coordinate collective action.
We believe there is value in interfaces that can inform gov-
ernments of the best ways to call citizens to action given
what has been organically observed to work online. Such
tools could inform governments of how to frame their calls
to action to effectively mobilize their supporters. In the fu-
ture we will explore interfaces that for a wide range of online
political communities can automatically detect how calls to
action are made for a variety of causes, and for a given goal
can inform best ways to mobilize citizens.
Some of the most interactive experiences on T D centered
on engagement with bots, especially by playing games with
them. Future work could investigate the effectiveness of this
type of gaming mechanisms to promote culture or ideology
in a community. This seems to be an effective way for this
trolling community to engage its members. Designers might
also consider how to make the promotion of a community’s
culture a game. For example, one could imagine creating
leadership boards for individuals who were able to mobilize
newcomers to adopt the community’s slang. Given also that
people built bots that were specifically tailored for T D, we
can imagine there is also value in facilitating tools through
which citizens can rapidly understand what technology has
been created to promote their ideology, and enabling them
to rapidly be able to build off and improve it, maybe even
have the development of tools be part of a game. The novel
aspect of our design proposition is to incorporate community
culture promotion and gamification as a core design factor
to civic media, for facilitating ideology or collective identity
building.
Limitations and Future Work
More empirical work needs to be carried out to understand
the connections between troll’s individual feelings of be-
longing, commitment and identification to a community, and
how much this results in the community’s mobilization, and
how the community’s collective identity is showcased. Fu-
ture work could also focus on understanding the processes
involved in creating “strong” or “weak” collective identities
in communities of online trolls. Another direction of future
work is understanding how trolls’ collective identity inter-
plays in whether people drop out of the movement that the
troll community is promoting.
The insights this work provides are limited by the method-
ology and population we studied. For example, the subreddit
we examined, T D, focuses around US politics, especially
the political campaign and presidency surrounding Donald
Trump. Hence our results might not describe how other sim-
ilar communities behave.
Our investigation also focused on breath, rather than on
depth. As a result, we do not know much about the identities
and motivations of the people participating in T D. Future
research would be wise to conduct detailed interviews with
the participants of this subreddit.
Conclusion
In this article we investigated the subreddit T D as a vehi-
cle for understanding sustained participated and collective
action production within political troll communities. In T D
to mobilize others it was most important to explain in de-
tail the political ecosystem and educate the public about the
meaning of certain events. This was the most effective strat-
egy in mobilizing other T D participants long term (highest
retention). The individuals with most sustained participation
used socio-technical tools, such as bots, to maintain them-
selves engaged and entertained. Our findings can help to de-
sign novel civic media and troll moderation strategies.
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